Washington Law Review
Volume 84

Number 3

8-1-2009

Urbanites Versus Rural Rights: Contest of Local Government
Land-Use Regulations under Washington Preemption Statute
82.02.020
Donya Williamson

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr
Part of the Land Use Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Donya Williamson, Note, Urbanites Versus Rural Rights: Contest of Local Government Land-Use
Regulations under Washington Preemption Statute 82.02.020, 84 Wash. L. Rev. 491 (2009).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr/vol84/iss3/4

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington Law Review by an authorized editor of UW Law Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@uw.edu.

Williamson_Comment_DPTed.docx (Do Not Delete)

8/31/2009 7:21 PM

Copyright © 2009 by Washington Law Review Association

URBANITES VERSUS RURAL RIGHTS:
CONTEST OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAND-USE
REGULATIONS UNDER WASHINGTON PREEMPTION
STATUTE 82.02.020
Donya Williamson
Abstract: In Citizens’ Alliance for Property Rights v. Sims,1 the Court of Appeals of
Washington held that King County clearing and grading regulations—recently enacted
pursuant to the Washington State Growth Management Act—constitute an unlawful “tax,
fee, or charge” on the development of land, thereby violating a Washington excise tax
preemption statute. The court ruled that the clearing limitations do not qualify under the
statutory exception for mitigation of development impacts since they are not calculated on a
site-by-site basis. This Note argues that the ruling greatly expands the scope of this statutory
limitation on local land-use regulation, compromises Growth Management Act policies, and
misconstrues prior case law. If upheld, the decision’s approach will significantly constrain
municipal authority to protect environmental quality through land-use regulations.

INTRODUCTION
Development restrictions implemented pursuant to the Washington
State Growth Management Act (GMA) have caused tension between
landowners, developers, and government2 since the state legislature
enacted the GMA in 1990.3 In King County, Washington, the conflict
1. 145 Wash. App. 649, 187 P.3d 786 (2008), cert. denied, 165 Wash. 2d 1030, 203 P.3d 378
(2009).
2. See generally, Quadrant Corp. v. State Growth Mgmt. Hearings Bd., 154 Wash. 2d 224, 110
P.3d 1132 (2005) (citizens’ group contested county’s designation of GMA-mandated urban growth
area); Ass’n of Rural Residents v. Kitsap County, 141 Wash. 2d 185, 4 P.3d 115 (2000) (citizens’
group contested county issuance of development permit for project outside of GMA-mandated
urban growth area); Snohomish County v. Anderson, 124 Wash. 2d 834, 881 P.2d 240 (1994)
(citizens’ group sought to subject county’s GMA-mandated planning policy to referendum);
Citizens’ Alliance, 145 Wash. App. 649, 187 P.3d 786 (citizens’ group contested county’s critical
areas ordinance, enacted pursuant to the GMA); Honesty in Envtl. Analysis and Legislation (HEAL)
v. Cent. Puget Sound Growth Mgmt. Hearings Bd., 96 Wash. App. 522, 979 P.2d 864 (1999)
(interest group challenged city’s adoption of critical areas ordinance, enacted pursuant to the GMA).
3. Growth Management Act, ch. 17, 1990 Wash. Sess. Laws 1st Ex. Sess. 1972 (codified as
amended at WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A (2008)); Growth Management Act—Revised Provisions,
ch. 32, 1991 Wash. Sess. Laws 1st Spec. Sess. 2903 (codified as amended at WASH. REV. CODE §
36.70A (2008)). The 1990 and 1991 legislatures enacted the GMA in two installments known as
“GMA I” and “GMA II.” Richard L. Settle & Charles G. Gavigan, The Growth Management
Revolution in Washington: Past, Present, and Future, 16 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 867, 871–72
(1993).
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also divides urban and rural interests. Approximately 1.9 million people
live in King County;4 and while nearly one-third of that population lives
in Seattle,5 over 1500 of the county’s 2000 square miles are zoned for
rural, forest, and agricultural uses.6 Nearly 150,000 people live in these
unincorporated rural areas.7
In 2004, the King County Council considered a controversial clearing
and grading ordinance that would prohibit rural landowners from
clearing some types of vegetation—generally, trees and brush—from
fifty or sixty-five percent of their land.8
Advocates argued that the limits were necessary to prevent further
erosion and flooding, and to keep chemicals from running into rivers and
streams.9 Rural residents, who took the position that the proposed
clearing and grading restrictions would unfairly limit what they could do
with their land, fought the ordinance throughout the public-comment
process,10 including at the October 25, 2004 King County Council

4. KING COUNTY OFFICE OF MGMT. AND BUDGET, 2008 ANNUAL GROWTH REPORT 55 (2008)
[hereinafter ANNUAL GROWTH 2008], available at http://www.metrokc.gov/budget/agr/agr08/
#cities. In Annual Growth 2008, the county reports 1,884,200 people resided in King County. Id. In
2004, when the county enacted its clearing and grading ordinance, 1,788,300 people resided in King
County. KING COUNTY OFFICE OF MGMT. AND BUDGET, 2004 ANNUAL GROWTH REPORT 55 (2004)
[hereinafter ANNUAL GROWTH 2004], available at http://www.metrokc.gov/budget/agr/agr04/
#cities.
5. ANNUAL GROWTH 2008, supra note 4, at 55. In ANNUAL GROWTH 2008, the county reports an
estimated 592,800 people resided in the City of Seattle. Id. In 2004, an estimated 572,600 people
resided in the City of Seattle. ANNUAL GROWTH 2004, supra note 4, at 55.
6. ANNUAL GROWTH 2008, supra note 4, inside front cover, 117 (noting rural unincorporated
King County has a land area of 1676 square miles).
7. ANNUAL GROWTH 2008, supra note 4, at 117. Rural unincorporated King County has a
population of about 144,000. Id. In 2004, rural unincorporated King County had a population of
about 137,000. ANNUAL GROWTH 2004, supra note 4, at 117.
8. KING COUNTY, WASH., ORDINANCE 15053 § 14 (2004), available at http://www.metrokc.gov/
mkcc/cao/clearing_grading_15053.pdf (codified at KING COUNTY, WASH., CODE tit. 16.82.150,
.152 (2008), available at http://www.kingcounty.gov/council/legislation/kc_code.aspx); Keith
Ervin, Court Says Rural-Land Restrictions Go Too Far, SEATTLE TIMES, Jul. 8, 2008, at A1
[hereinafter Ervin, Restrictions Go Too Far]; see Keith Ervin, Panel Approves Land-Use Package,
SEATTLE TIMES, Sept. 29, 2004, at B1 [hereinafter Ervin, Panel Approves].
9. Natalie Singer, Suit Challenges Land-Use Rules, SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 4, 2005, at B5.
10. Keith Ervin, County Approves Pair of Land-Use Regulations, SEATTLE TIMES, Oct. 26, 2004,
at B1 [hereinafter Ervin, County Approves]; Keith Ervin, Foes Vow Court Fight Over Land-Use
Rules, SEATTLE TIMES, Aug. 2, 2004, at B1 [hereinafter Ervin, Court Fight]; Ervin, Panel
Approves, supra note 8, at B1; Laura Onstot, Can’t Keep Them Down on the Farm, SEATTLE
WEEKLY, Sept. 3, 2008, at 16.
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meeting at which the members cast their votes.11 The ordinance passed
by a 7–6 vote divided along partisan lines, with Democrats, who largely
represented urban areas,12 voting in favor of its enactment.13
Although the county had revised the ordinance based on public
feedback, the ordinance as enacted was not a satisfactory compromise
for the rural opposition. Citizens’ Alliance for Property Rights, a
political action committee comprising property owners potentially
impacted by the county’s proposed clearing and grading restrictions,
sued King County. It argued that the ordinance ran afoul of the state
constitution and amounted to a tax prohibited by state law.14
The Washington State Court of Appeals held that the clearing and
grading ordinance was an unlawful “tax, fee, or charge” because it did
not require individually determined clearing and grading restrictions
based on site-specific evaluations of each plot of land.15 The court did
not reach the constitutional issues.16 The decision could seriously
undermine the ability of local governments to plan for responsible land
use. If counties have to conduct site-specific evaluations, it will be more
costly and time-consuming to create the comprehensive land-use plans
the GMA requires.
This Note argues that the court of appeals erred in calling the land-use
regulations an unlawful “tax, fee, or charge.” Part I gives an overview of
the GMA. Part II introduces constitutional and statutory protections
available to Washington landowners and developers, and Part III
describes key cases interpreting some of these protections. Part IV
introduces the King County ordinance, reviews the environmental
concerns that spurred the ordinance, and discusses the rural response to
the clearing restrictions. Part V describes Citizens’ Alliance for Property
Rights v. Sims, 17 which Part VI argues was decided in error.
11. Ervin, County Approves, supra note 10, at B1.
12. Id. at B7.
13. KING COUNTY, WASH., ORDINANCE 15053.
14. Citizens’ Alliance for Prop. Rights v. Sims, 145 Wash. App. 649, 654, 187 P.3d 786, 789
(2008); First Amended Complaint for Violation of RCW 82.02, Substantive Due Process (Wash.
Const. art. I § 3), and Declaratory Relief at 5–7, Citizens’ Alliance, No. 04-2-13831-9 (Wash. Super.
Ct. Snohomish County, filed Mar. 3, 2005); Onstot, supra note 10, at 18.
15. Citizens’ Alliance, 145 Wash. App. at 665, 187 P.3d at 794.
16. Id. at 653, 187 P.3d at 788.
17. 145 Wash. App. 649, 187 P.3d 786 (2008), cert. denied, 165 Wash. 2d 1030, 203 P.3d 378
(2009). Ronald Sims served as King County Executive from 1996 to 2009. Keith Ervin, King
County Exec Race Centers on Budget Skills, SEATTLE TIMES, June 14, 2009, at B1.
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THE GMA EMPOWERS LOCAL GOVERNMENTS TO
DEVELOP COMPREHENSIVE LAND-USE PLANS

The Washington landscape includes forestland, pastures, wetlands
and deserts, and the state’s people live in vast ranching areas and farm
communities as well as densely populated cities and suburbs.18
Washington’s natural resources, from salmon to lumber to minerals,
were the cornerstone of its economy throughout its early years.19 During
the 1970s and 1980s a massive influx of new residents20 strained the
state’s environment and landscape.21 By the late 1980s, it had become
clear that Washington needed new approaches to manage population
growth and development.22
In 1990, the Washington State Legislature passed the Growth
Management Act,23 which channels growth into urban centers and aims
to reduce sprawl and preserve the character of rural areas.24 The
responsibility for implementing and enforcing the GMA’s mandates falls
chiefly to local governments,25 allowing land-use planning under the
GMA to account for local problems and needs. This can result in tension
in counties with large urban populations and urban-centered local
18. Onstot, supra note 10, at 17.
19. Id.
20. WASHINGTON STATE OFFICE OF FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, POPULATION CHANGE BY
DECADE: EAST AND WEST (2001), http://www.ofm.wa.gov/census2000/pl/charts/chart02.asp
[hereinafter POPULATION CHANGE]; see Settle & Gavigan, supra note 3, at 880–81; Ed Penhale,
Managing State Growth Looms as Hot Issue for ‘90 Legislature, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER,
Jan. 1, 1990, at A1.
21. Settle & Gavigan, supra note 3, at 880–81; Penhale, supra note 20, at A1; see also,
POPULATION CHANGE, supra note 20.
22. Settle & Gavigan, supra note 3, at 880–81; Penhale, supra note 20, at A1; Joseph W. Tovar,
Needed: A Central Vision—A New Strategy for Growth, SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 3, 1989, at A20
(discussing a report of conclusions and recommendations by members of the Washington City
Planning Directors Association and the Washington State Association of County Regional Planning
Directors with respect to a new strategy for growth management in Washington).
23. Growth Management Act, ch. 17, 1990 Wash. Sess. Laws 1st Ex. Sess. 1972, (codified as
amended at WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A (2008)); see also Growth Management Act—Revised
Provisions, ch. 32, 1991 Wash. Sess. Laws 1st Spec. Sess. 2903 (codified as amended at WASH.
REV. CODE § 36.70A (2008)).
24. WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.020 (2008) (listing the Act’s planning goals, including
“[e]ncourag[ing] . . . development in urban areas where adequate public facilities and services exist
or can be provided in an efficient manner” and “[r]educ[ing] the inappropriate conversion of
undeveloped land into sprawling, low-density development.”).
25. See WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.040(1) (2008). In this Note, “local government” refers to the
governing bodies of towns, cities, or counties.
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government because rural landowners sometimes feel their voices are
overwhelmed by urbanites who do not understand rural lifestyles,
underestimate ruralites’ environmental awareness, and assign a
disproportionate share of environmental protection costs to the rural
minority.26
A.

Local Governments Must Enact Land-Use Regulations
Consistent with the GMA’s Goals and According to Defined
Procedures

By the late 1980s Washington’s economy was booming, but the
steadily increasing population and urban sprawl created traffic
congestion,27 reduced areas of open space,28 and intensified instances of
environmental degradation.29 The state was in dire need of a
comprehensive strategy to manage growth.30 The land-use and
development policies in effect were scattered throughout statutes enacted
over the course of a century: a constitution written in the late 1880s,31
planning laws adopted in the 1930s,32 and environmental acts passed in
the 1970s and 1980s.33 State agencies were sending uncoordinated and
conflicting messages to local governments, private developers, and the
public,34 and local governments were working under one of the weakest
mandates for comprehensive planning in the United States.35
In 1990, the state legislature passed the GMA,36 which empowers
26. See Onstot, supra note 10, at 17.
27. Settle & Gavigan, supra note 3, at 880; Penhale, supra note 20, at A4.
28. Penhale, supra note 20, at A1; see Tovar, supra note 22, at A20.
29. Settle & Gavigan, supra note 3, at 880. The state population grew by about 734,000 people in
the 1980s, with more than ninety percent of that growth concentrated in western Washington.
POPULATION CHANGE, supra note 20; see Onstot, supra note 10, at 17; Penhale, supra note 20, at
A1; Tovar, supra note 22, at A20.
30. See Settle & Gavigan, supra note 3, at 870–72, 880–81; Penhale, supra note 20, at A1, 4;
Tovar, supra note 22, at A20.
31. Tovar, supra note 22, at A20.
32. Id.
33. Id. (“Prime examples [of conflicting planning strategies] are the Transportation 1990 Plan, the
Environment 2010 Report and the Washington Works Worldwide economic development
strategy. . . . Each effort proceeded with independent direction . . . . ”).
34. Id.; see Settle & Gavigan, supra note 3, at 875–80.
35. Tovar, supra note 22, at A20.
36. Growth Management Act, ch. 17, 1990 Wash. Sess. Laws 1st Ex. Sess. 1972, (codified as
amended at WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A (2008)); see also, Growth Management Act—Revised
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local governments to create land-use plans, called “comprehensive
plans,” consistent with economic development and environmental
protection.37 The GMA lists thirteen planning goals, including protecting
the environment, focusing growth in high-density urban areas, protecting
landowners from arbitrary and capricious regulations, and promoting
development “within the capacities of the state’s natural resources.”38
Local governments bear primary responsibility for implementing the
GMA’s mandate,39 but the GMA does not tell them how to balance what
critics have described as contradictory goals.40
Under the GMA, all of the state’s local governments must designate
“critical areas” and enact regulations to protect them.41 Critical areas
include wetlands, areas essential for potable water, and fish and wildlife
conservation areas.42 The GMA requires local governments to use the
“best available science” to identify critical areas and to craft the
restrictions that apply to them.43 Scientific inquiry is particularly
relevant to the designation and regulation of critical areas, although local
governments may balance scientific findings against the GMA’s other
goals.44

Provisions, ch. 32, 1991 Wash. Laws 1st Spec. Sess. 2903 (codified as amended at WASH. REV.
CODE § 36.70A (2008)).
37. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 36.70A.010, .020, .040 (2008); see also WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 365195 (2009) (“Growth Management Act—Procedural Criteria for Adopting Comprehensive Plans
and Development Regulations”).
38. WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.020(1)–(13).
39. Id. § 36.70A.040.
40. 24 TIM BUTLER & MATTHEW KING, WASHINGTON PRACTICE: ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND
PRACTICE § 18.2, at 231 (2d ed. 2008) (“[A] cursory review of these goals reveals they are vague
and contradictory.” (citing Carol M. Ostrom, Land-Use Planning—Or Just Land Grab? Chelan
County Fight Could Affect Whole State, SEATTLE TIMES, Feb. 8, 1996, at A1)).
41. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 36.70A.060(2)–(3), .170 (“Each county and city shall adopt
development regulations that protect critical areas that are required to be designated under RCW
36.70A.170.”); see also WASH ADMIN. CODE §§ 365-190-040, -080 (2009).
42. WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.030(5).
43. Id. § 36.70A.172(1). This requirement was added to the GMA in 1995. Growth Management
Act, ch. 347 § 105, 1995 Wash. Sess. Laws 1st Reg. Sess. 1556, 1560. The mandatory procedure for
application of the best available science is set forth in the Washington Administrative Code. WASH.
ADMIN. CODE §§ 365-195-900–920 (2009). See generally Alan D. Copsey, Including Best Available
Science in the Designation and Protection of Critical Areas Under the Growth Management Act, 23
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 97 (1999).
44. Honesty in Envtl. Analysis and Legislation (HEAL) v. Cent. Puget Sound Growth Mgmt.
Hearings Bd., 96 Wash. App. 522, 531–32, 979 P.2d 864, 870 (1999).
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Heavily populated counties or counties experiencing rapid growth45
must do more than identify and protect critical areas: Their
comprehensive land-use plans must include a map identifying urbangrowth areas and areas where only rural land use will be allowed.46 Plans
must also identify the different regulations that will govern each type of
land.47 The GMA itself mandates that all urban development must occur
within urban-growth areas, just as it requires local government to
regulate rural lands in a way that preserves rural-based economies and
traditional rural lifestyles.48
B.

GMA Regulations Cause Tension Between Government, Private
Property Owners, and Developers

The GMA has created tension between private landowners and local
governments because it restricts certain uses of property in order to
control the environmental impact of development49 and flirts with the
line between impermissible takings or due process violations, and
permissible uses of government police power.50 Critics have charged that
the GMA’s thirteen goals are contradictory and irreconcilable. For
example, regulations to achieve one GMA planning goal—to protect the
environment—are often a hindrance to another GMA planning goal—to
encourage economic development.51 Many landowners, especially rural
landowners who make a living from their land, also feel that GMA
45. Counties that must conform to the GMA include: (1) counties with populations of more than
50,000 that also experienced more than ten percent population growth between 1985 and 1995; (2)
counties with populations of more than 50,000 that also experienced more than seventeen percent
population growth within the past ten years; and (3) counties that, regardless of their populations,
had population growth exceeding twenty percent in the past ten years. WASH. REV. CODE §
36.70A.040(1)–(2).
46. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 36.70A.030(15), .070; WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 365-195-300.
47. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 36.70A.060, .110; See WASH. ADMIN. CODE §§ 365-195-400–410.
48. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 36.70A.011, .020, .070(5)(b), .110; see WASH. ADMIN. CODE §§ 365195-330–335.
49. WASHINGTON RESEARCH COUNCIL, GMA: GOALS AND PROMISES REVIEWED 7, PROPERTY
RIGHTS AND THE GROWTH MANAGEMENT ACT 1 (2002), available at http://www.researchcouncil.
org/publications_container/GMA7.pdf [hereinafter PROPERTY RIGHTS].
50. See Jeffrey M. Eustis, Between Scylla and Charybdis: Growth Management Act
Implementation That Avoids Takings and Substantive Due Process Limitations, 16 U. PUGET
SOUND L. REV. 1181, 1181–85 (1993); John M. Groen & Richard M. Stephens, Takings Law, Lucas,
and the Growth Management Act, 16 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 1259, 1300–01 (1993).
51. WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.020(5), (10); BUTLER & KING, supra note 40, § 18.2, at 231;
PROPERTY RIGHTS, supra note 49, at 2.
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regulations go too far.52 When the Chelan County Commissioners were
debating GMA regulations, long-time residents framed the issue as
squarely involving their property rights: “We don’t need some governor
telling us what to do with our land,” orchard owner Bob Peterson told a
Seattle newspaper reporter.53 “If you start passing legislation and laws
that take away from the ability of a property owner to make his income
or retirement off it, then you’ve gone beyond what’s right.”54
The GMA requires local governments to provide a public forum
where these disputes can be aired before decision-makers.55
Requirements for comprehensive plans include public notice, public
review and comment,56 and consideration of public feedback.57 But after
that process, the decision lies in the hands of elected officials, who do
not have to adopt the policies favored by the majority of those who
participated in the process.58
The administrative courts that review GMA-related decisions, Growth
Management Hearings Boards (GMHBs), give deference to elected
officials with respect to their decisions about GMA regulations.59 A
GMHB can set aside a local government plan only if it “is clearly
erroneous in view of the entire record before the Board and in light of
the public participation requirements of [the GMA].”60 Parties may also
agree to waive review before a GMHB and take their dispute directly to
a county superior court, where the same standard of review—deference
to elected officials—applies.61
52. BUTLER & KING, supra note 40, § 18.2, at 231.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 36.70A.035(2), .140.
56. Id. § 36.70A.035.
57. Id. § 36.70A.140.
58. City of Burien v. Cent. Puget Sound Growth Mgmt. Hearings Bd., 113 Wash. App. 375, 388,
53 P.3d 1028, 1035 (2002) (holding that the GMA requires public participation in the development
and amendment of comprehensive land-use plans and regulations, but does not require that local
government act upon the desires expressed by the public).
59. STATE OF WASHINGTON GROWTH MANAGEMENT HEARINGS BOARD, PRACTICING BEFORE
THE GROWTH MANAGEMENT HEARINGS BOARDS FOR WASHINGTON STATE 6 (2008) [hereinafter
HEARINGS BOARD], http://www.gmhb.wa.gov/images/pdf/PracticeHandbookAug2008.pdf. There
are three GMHBs: the Eastern Board, the Central Puget Sound Board, and the Western Board. Id. at
4.
60. City of Burien, 113 Wash. App. at 383, 53 P.3d at 1032 (quoting WASH. REV. CODE §
36.70A.320(3) (2002) (emphasis added)); see HEARINGS BOARD, supra note 59, at 6.
61. WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.295; see WASH. ADMIN. CODE §§ 242-02-290–295 (2009).
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While the public has the opportunity to shape comprehensive plans
through public participation processes, and there are a number of forums
in which to be heard, rural property owners often perceive this process
as futile: A conflict between city politicians who cannot identify with the
perspectives of rural property owners and the rural property owners who
believe they bear a drastic and disproportionate share of the cost of
environmental protection.62
II.

WASHINGTON LAW PROVIDES CONSTITUTIONAL AND
STATUTORY PROTECTIONS FOR PROPERTY OWNERS

Property owners with grievances about overreaching government
land-use decisions have several state law protections. The Washington
State Constitution provides takings63 and substantive due process
protections,64 and Washington statutes prevent local governments from
using their authority to withhold development permits to extract
revenue-generating concessions.65
A.

Washington Landowners Enjoy Strong Constitutional
Protections from Overreaching Government Land-Use
Regulations

Washington has a long history of vesting broad police powers in local
governments,66 and the state constitution provides that “[a]ny county,
city, town or township may make and enforce within its limits all such
local police, sanitary and other regulations as are not in conflict with
general laws.”67 Local governments may create any local regulation so
long as it is consistent with state law, is aimed at a legitimate
government purpose, and is reasonably calculated to achieve that

62. See e.g., Ervin, County Approves, supra note 10, at B7; Ervin, Court Fight, supra note 10, at
B4; Onstot, supra note 10, at 18; BUTLER & KING, supra note 40, § 18.2, at 231.
63. WASH. CONST. art I, § 16.
64. Id. § 3.
65. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 82.02.020–.090. Washington residents with land disputes also have a
number of forums in which to be heard, including courts and quasi-judicial and administrative
forums such as Growth Management Hearings Boards. See supra Part I.B.
66. See Hugh D. Spitzer, Municipal Police Power in Washington State, 75 WASH. L. REV. 494,
497–506 (2000).
67. WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 11.
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purpose.68
However, Washington’s constitution provides protections against
overreaching local land-use regulations for landowners, who can bring
both takings and substantive due process claims.69 Washington courts
analyze the takings claim first,70 and start with the “threshold inquiry” of
whether the regulation amounts to a “physical invasion” or “total taking”
as well as whether it “destroys or derogates any fundamental attribute of
property ownership: including the right to possess; to exclude others; or
to dispose of property.”71 If it is either a physical invasion or total taking,
the regulation amounts to a taking, and the government must compensate
the landowner.72
If the land-use regulation at issue does not involve a physical invasion
or total taking, courts next ask “whether the challenged regulation
safeguards the public interest in health, safety, the environment or the
fiscal integrity of an area.”73 This type of legitimate regulation, the
Washington State Supreme Court has said, stands in contrast to one that
“seeks less to prevent a harm than to impose on those regulated the
requirement of providing an affirmative public benefit.”74 If a court finds
that the regulation promotes a legitimate purpose and does not destroy a
fundamental attribute of ownership, the analysis ends: No taking has
68. Spitzer, supra note 66, at 507–09 (citing Petsel, Inc. v. King County, 77 Wash. 2d 144, 154–
55, 459 P.2d 937, 942–43 (1969)); see County of Spokane v. Valu-Mart, Inc., 69 Wash. 2d 712,
719, 419 P.2d 993, 998 (1966); see also In re 14255 53rd Ave. S., 120 Wash. App. 737, 749, 86
P.3d 222, 227 (2004) (holding no compensation was required where the Washington Department of
Agriculture undertook to destroy all trees that might be host to the citrus longhorned beetle to
prevent a widespread infestation because it was a justifiable action to avert public calamity).
69. WASH. CONST. art. I, §§ 3, 16. The Washington judiciary uses the Orion-Presbytery test to
determine whether a takings or substantive due process analysis is appropriate. Spitzer, supra note
66, at 514–16; ROBERT F. UTTER & HUGH D. SPITZER, THE WASHINGTON STATE CONSTITUTION, A
REFERENCE GUIDE 31 (G. Alan Tarr ed., Greenwood Press 2002) (relying on Presbytery of Seattle
v. King County, 114 Wash. 2d 320, 787 P.2d 907 (1990)); see Guimont v. Clarke, 121 Wash. 2d
586, 616–17, 854 P.2d 1, 18 (1993) (Utter, J., concurring) (citing Presbytery, 114 Wash. 2d at 329–
30, 787 P.2d at 912–13; Orion Corp. v. State, 109 Wash. 2d 621, 651, 747 P.2d 1062, 1078 (1987));
Orion, 109 Wash. 2d 621, 747 P.2d 1062 (1987).
70. Guimont, 121 Wash. 2d at 594–95, 853 P.2d at 5 (citing Presbytery, 114 Wash. 2d at 329, 787
P.2d at 912).
71. Id. at 602, 853 P.2d at 10 (citations omitted).
72. Id. at 602–03, 853 P.2d at 10 (citing Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015–18
(1992)).
73. Id. at 603, 853 P.2d at 10 (relying on Robinson v. Seattle, 119 Wash. 2d 34, 49, 830 P.2d 318,
327–28 (1992)).
74. Id. (citing Robinson, 119 Wash. 2d at 49, 830 P.2d at 328).
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occurred. However, if a court finds a regulation fails this analysis, it next
considers “whether [it] substantially advances a legitimate state interest.
If it does not, the regulation is a taking.”75 If the regulation substantially
advances a legitimate state purpose, courts balance the state interest in
the regulation against the economic impact on the landowner,
considering “(1) the regulation’s economic impact on the property; (2)
the extent of [its] interference with investment-backed expectations; and
(3) the character of the government action.”76 If a court finds a taking
has occurred, “just compensation is mandated.”77
The Washington State Supreme Court has declared that “[e]ven if a
regulation is not susceptible to a takings challenge,” courts must still
“subject [it] to substantive due process scrutiny for reasonableness.”78
Courts determine “(1) whether the regulation is aimed at achieving a
legitimate public purpose; (2) whether it uses means that are reasonably
necessary to achieve that purpose; and (3) whether it is unduly
oppressive on the landowner.”79 A court invalidates property regulations
that fail this substantive due process test.80
B.

Washington Law Limits Counties’ Authority to Tax Development

Washington law limits the power of local governments to extract
taxes and fees from developers. Section 82.02.020 of the Revised Code
of Washington (RCW) (the “state preemption statute”) preempts certain
taxes, fees, and charges relating to development.81 It reads, in relevant
part:
Except as provided in RCW 64.34.440 and 82.02.050 through
82.02.090, no [local government] shall impose any tax, fee, or
charge, either direct or indirect, on the . . . development . . . of
land. However, this section does not preclude dedications of
75. Id. at 604, 853 P.2d at 11 (citing Presbytery, 114 Wash. 2d at 333, 787 P.2d at 914; Robinson,
119 Wash. 2d at 50, 830 P.2d at 328) (emphasis added).
76. Id. (citing Presbytery, 114 Wash. 2d at 335–36, 787 P.2d at 915; Robinson, 119 Wash. 2d at
51, 830 P.2d at 328).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 608, 853 P.2d at 13–14 (citing Presbytery, 114 Wash. 2d at 330, 787 P.2d at 912–13).
79. Id. at 609, 853 P.2d at 14 (quoting Presbytery, 114 Wash. 2d at 330, 787 P.2d at 913).
80. Id. at 616, 853 P.2d at 18 (Utter, J., concurring) (citing Orion Corp. v. State, 109 Wash. 2d
621, 657, 747 P.2d 1062, 1081 (1987)).
81. RCW 58.17 also addresses state power to regulate plats, subdivisions, and dedications.
WASH. REV. CODE §§ 58.17.010–.210 (2008).

501

Williamson_Comment_DPTed.docx (Do Not Delete)

Washington Law Review

8/31/2009 7:21 PM

Vol. 84:491, 2009

land or easements . . . which the [local government] can
demonstrate are reasonably necessary as a direct result of the
proposed development . . . .
This section does not prohibit voluntary agreements with
[local governments] that allow a payment in lieu of a dedication
of land or to mitigate a direct impact that has been identified as a
consequence of a proposed development . . . .82
The statute protects developers from having to pay taxes, fees, or
charges as a condition of development, unless those payments directly
relate to the impacts of their specific developments. The exceptions in
RCW 82.02.050 through 82.02.090 allow local governments to impose
mitigation measures to offset the costs new development will create.83
Since 1982, RCW 82.02.020 has undergone two substantial
revisions.84 The first change addressed an issue then before the
Washington State Supreme Court: whether local governments could use
their power to approve development applications as a revenue-raising
device by conditioning approval on payment of fees.85 The legislature
allowed them to charge only those fees “reasonably necessary as a direct
result of the proposed development,” and forbade fees that “exceed the
proportionate share of [the proposed development’s] costs.”86 Put
simply, the legislature allowed local governments to recoup costs they
would incur because of a development, but forbade them from inflating
their balance sheets by using their authority to approve developments to
82. WASH. REV. CODE § 82.02.020.
83. WASH. REV. CODE § 82.02.050–.090. The legislature added sections 82.02.050 and 82.02.090
as part of the Growth Management Act. Isla Verde Int’l Holdings, Inc. v. City of Camas, 146 Wash.
2d 740, 753 n.9, 49 P.3d 867, 875 n.9 (2002) (citing Growth Management Act, ch. 17, §§ 42–44,
46–48, 1990 Wash. Sess. Laws 1st Ex. Sess. 1972, 1994–98, 1999–2001).
84. Prior to 1982, RCW 82.02.020 addressed state preemption regarding the imposition of taxes
on retail sales, and use of personal property, pari-mutuel wagering, conveyances, and cigarettes; it
did not concern development exactions for permitting. Act of May 24, 1979, ch. 196, § 3, 1979
Wash. Sess. Laws 1st Ex. Sess. 1755, 1758 (amended 1982); Martha S. Lester, Subdivision
Exactions in Washington: The Controversy Over Imposing Fees On Developers, 59 WASH. L. REV.
289, 294 n.40 (1984).
85. Hillis Homes, Inc. v. Snohomish County, 97 Wash. 2d 804, 810, 650 P.2d 193, 195–96
(1982) (holding that where local governments exact fees in order to raise revenue, rather than to
forward a regulatory purpose, those fees constitute an unlawful tax under the Washington State
Constitution). RCW 82.02.020, as amended in 1982, diminished the significance of the Hillis
decision because it statutorily limits the ability of municipalities to put conditions on plat approval
for the development of land. Lester, supra note 84, at 289–90; see Ivy Club Investors Ltd. P’ship v.
City of Kennewick, 40 Wash. App. 524, 529, 699 P.2d 782, 785 (1985).
86. WASH. REV. CODE § 82.02.020.

502

Williamson_Comment_DPTed.docx (Do Not Delete)

8/31/2009 7:21 PM

Contest of Land-Use Regulations
extort money from developers.
Similar concerns drove the 1990 amendment to RCW 82.02.020,
enacted in response to the GMA.87 The 1990 amendment authorized
local governments to recoup certain costs incurred from improving
public facilities under the GMA,88 but the legislature clearly wanted to
limit local authorities to only assessing fees for system improvements
reasonably and proportionately related to that new development.89 For
example, the statute requires that local governments immediately deposit
the funds received into an earmarked account, and spend the money on
the identified purpose within five years.90 If the funds are not spent
within five years, the developer gets a refund.91
III.

THE SUPREME COURT OF WASHINGTON HAS
INTERPRETED RCW 82.02.020 TO FORBID TAXES, FEES,
OR CHARGES UNRELATED TO A DEVELOPMENT’S
IMPACT

RCW 82.02.020 has generated lawsuits against local governments by
developers and landowners who claim that land set-aside requirements
are an impermissible “tax, fee, or charge.”92 The Washington State
Supreme Court has agreed that local governments impose a tax by
requiring land set-asides, but have allowed local governments to do just
that if the requirements are reasonably related to the direct impact of a
development.93

87. Growth Management Act, ch. 17, §§ 42–44, 46–48, 1990 Wash. Sess. Laws 1st Ex. Sess.
1972, 1994–98, 1999–2001 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 82.02.050–.090 (2008)); Isla Verde,
146 Wash. 2d at 753 n.9, 49 P.3d at 875 n.9.
88. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 82.02.050–.090; Isla Verde, 146 Wash. 2d at 753 n.9, 49 P.3d at 875
n.9 (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 82.02.050(2) (2002)).
89. Isla Verde, 146 Wash. 2d at 753 n.9, 49 P.3d at 875 n.9 (citing WASH. REV. CODE
§ 82.02.050(2) (2002)).
90. WASH. REV. CODE § 82.02.080 (2008).
91. Id.
92. Citizens’ Alliance for Prop. Rights v. Sims, 145 Wash. App. 649, 653–54, 187 P.3d 786, 788
(2008), cert. denied, 165 Wash. 2d. 1030, 203 P.3d 378 (2009); Isla Verde, 146 Wash. 2d at 753–
58, 49 P.3d at 874–78; Vintage Constr. Co. v. City of Bothell, 83 Wash. App. 605, 607–08, 922
P.2d 828, 829 (1996); Trimen Dev. Co. v. King County, 124 Wash. 2d 261, 264, 877 P.2d 187,
188–89 (1994). See generally Lester, supra note 84.
93. E.g., Isla Verde, 146 Wash. 2d at 759–61, 49 P.3d at 878–79; Trimen, 124 Wash. 2d at 274–
75, 877 P.2d at 194–95.
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In Trimen, the Court Upheld a County’s Open Space Ordinance
Because It Was Reasonably Calculated to Remedy an
Underlying Need

In Trimen Development Company v. King County,94 the Supreme
Court of Washington upheld a King County open-space ordinance
requiring that subdivision developers reserve or dedicate open space for
the recreational needs of new residents who would live in the
subdivision.95 Developers also had the option of paying a fee in lieu,
equivalent in value to the land they would have had to set aside, that the
county could use only “for the acquisition and development of open
space, park sites, and recreational facilities . . . where the proposed
subdivision is located.”96 Trimen Development Company (Trimen)
objected to the fee in lieu, arguing that it constituted an “unauthorized
tax.”97
King County had identified the need for open space in 1981 when the
county council found a “general and increasing need for parks, open
spaces and recreational facilities to serve the expanding population of
the County.”98 The council found that the problem was especially “acute
at the neighborhood level” because of new subdivisions.99 The county
commissioned a study in 1985 that found a deficit of more than one
hundred acres of parks and open space in the Northshore community,
where Trimen proposed to develop.100 Trimen submitted two Northshore
plans, one for twenty-one acres divided into seventy-seven lots, and the
other for twenty-two acres divided into forty-one lots.101 Instead of
reserving or dedicating a little more than one acre per development as
open space, Trimen opted to pay fees in lieu.102
A few months after receiving final approval on both plats, Trimen
sued, alleging that the county’s fee in lieu was an unlawful “tax, fee, or

94. 124 Wash. 2d 261, 877 P.2d 187 (1994).
95. Id. at 274, 877 P.2d at 194 (referring to KING COUNTY, WASH., CODE § 19.38 (1981)).
96. Id. at 265, 877 P.2d at 189.
97. Id. at 268–69, 877 P.2d at 191.
98. Id. at 264, 877 P.2d at 189.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 274, 877 P.2d at 194.
101. Id. at 266, 877 P.2d at 190.
102. Id. at 267, 877 P.2d at 190.
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charge” under RCW 82.02.020.103 The state supreme court rejected that
argument: “We have previously stated that ‘if the primary purpose of the
legislation is regulation rather than raising revenue, the legislation
cannot be classified as a tax even if a burden or charge is imposed.’”104
Trimen also argued that the ordinance conflicted with RCW 82.02.020
because the county had failed to establish that the land reservations and
dedications or associated fees were “reasonably necessary as a direct
result of the proposed development or plat.”105 Trimen argued that the
county had arrived at its conclusion by applying a mechanical formula:
“Under King County’s fee exaction methodology, a publicly accessible
swimming pool, tennis court, golf course, soccer field, and baseball
diamond could all be across the street from [the proposed subdivisions],
and the exact same park fee would be assessed . . . .”106 According to
Trimen, state law gave it the right to a site-specific evaluation.
The Court disagreed. King County based its formula on information
contained in the 1985 comprehensive report, which had identified a
significant lack of parks and open space in the very area where Trimen
was hoping to build 112 homes with an average of three occupants
each.107 For the Court, that was enough: “King County correctly
assessed the direct impact of Trimen’s developments on the demand for
neighborhood parks and imposed a fee reasonably necessary to mitigate
these impacts.”108
B.

In Isla Verde, the Court Invalidated a City’s Open Space SetAside Requirement Because the City Did Not Show a
Reasonably Calculated Relationship Between the Regulation
and the Proposed Development
In Isla Verde International Holdings, Inc. v. City of Camas,109 the

103. Id. at 268–69, 877 P.2d at 191.
104. Id. at 270, 877 P.2d at 192 (quoting Hillis Homes, Inc. v. Snohomish County, 97 Wash. 2d
804, 809, 650 P.2d 193, 195 (1982)) (internal citation omitted).
105. Id. at 273–74, 877 P.2d at 193–94 (quoting WASH. REV. CODE § 82.02.020 (1982)).
106. Brief of Appellant at 25–26, Trimen Dev. Co. v. King County, 124 Wash. 2d 261, 877 P.2d
187 (1994) (No. 57881-8).
107. Trimen, 124 Wash. 2d at 274, 877 P.2d at 194.
108. Id. at 275, 877 P.2d at 194 (“King County’s fee in lieu of dedication is calculated based on
zoning, projected population, and the assessed value of the land that would have been dedicated or
reserved. King County’s assessment of fees in lieu of dedication are specific to the site . . . .”).
109. 146 Wash. 2d 740, 49 P.3d 867 (2002).
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Supreme Court of Washington invalidated a Camas Municipal Code
provision that applied an open space set-aside of thirty percent to every
proposed subdivision.110 The city council had great discretion, and could
waive the requirement in favor of a fee in lieu upon two findings: (1)
that the set-aside “would not fulfill the intent or purpose of useful
common open space,” and (2) “that a payment of an equivalent fee in
lieu . . . is appropriate.”111 Isla Verde International Holdings, Inc. (Isla
Verde) objected to the regulation, and the Washington State Supreme
Court struck it down because it did not bear the requisite relationship to
the proposed development under RCW 82.02.020.112
In 1995, Isla Verde had submitted a proposed 13.4-acre development
that included fifty-one homes.113 Many Camas residents spoke out
against the proposal, in part because the property had steep slopes of
forest containing wildlife, including two species being monitored by the
Fish and Wildlife Service: the pileated woodpecker and ringneck
snake.114 The fire marshal also expressed concern about the fact that
only one road provided access to the development, making emergency
response service difficult during wildfires.115 The city council approved
Isla Verde’s development proposal notwithstanding those concerns, but
required Isla Verde to set aside the full thirty percent of the land,
refusing to accept a fee in lieu.116
Isla Verde sought review of the city’s decision, alleging that the City
of Camas had violated its constitutional property rights and that the setaside requirement was an unlawful tax.117 The trial court and court of
appeals agreed, both finding that the regulation amounted to an
unconstitutional taking.118 The city petitioned the Washington State
110. Id. at 765, 49 P.3d at 881 (regarding CAMAS, WASH., MUN. CODE § 18.62.020(A) (1991),
invalidated by Isla Verde, 146 Wash. 2d 740, 49 P.3d 867 (2002)).
111. Id. at 747 n.3, 49 P.3d at 871 n.3 (quoting CAMAS, WASH., MUN. CODE §17.12.090(E)
(1991)).
112. Id. at 763–64, 49 P.3d at 880.
113. Id. at 745–46, 49 P.3d at 871.
114. Id. at 748–49, 49 P.3d at 872.
115. Id. at 746, 767, 49 P.3d at 871, 882. There were two issues in this case: (1) whether the City
of Camas’s open-space ordinance was proper; and (2) whether the City of Camas could require Isla
Verde to construct a secondary limited access road on the development for emergency vehicles. Id.
at 745, 49 P.3d at 867. This Note focuses on the former issue.
116. Id. at 749–50, 49 P.3d at 873.
117. Id. at 750, 49 P.3d at 873.
118. Id.
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Supreme Court for review.119 The Court declined to reach the
constitutional issue, deciding instead that the set-aside regulation was an
unlawful “tax, fee, or charge” under RCW 82.02.020.120
The Court concluded that a land dedication qualifies as a tax.121 The
issue then became whether the thirty percent set-aside required of Isla
Verde was “reasonably necessary as a direct result of the proposed
development.”122 The city argued that the case was like Trimen, in that
the city preferred to keep a certain percentage of land as open space and
required developers to set aside that percentage.123 The Court was not
persuaded: In Trimen, King County based its findings on a
comprehensive study,124 whereas the record in Isla Verde indicated that
the City of Camas was relying on a bare legislative determination of the
need for open space.125 Furthermore, King County had studied the
particular community and its needs for parks,126 whereas the City of
Camas applied its thirty percent open-space requirement to any proposed
subdivision in Camas.127 King County could directly trace the need for
open space to the 112 homes Trimen hoped to build.128 The City of
Camas could make no such showing with respect to Isla Verde.129 The
119. Id. at 751, 49 P.3d at 873.
120. Id. at 752, 49 P.3d at 874 (“We adhere to the fundamental principle that if a case can be
decided on nonconstitutional grounds, an appellate court should refrain from deciding constitutional
issues.”).
121. Id. at 757–58, 49 P.3d at 877 (“The exclusionary language of the statute demonstrates that
the prohibited charges are not limited to monetary charges. . . . [A] required dedication of land or
easement is a tax, fee or charge.” (citing San Telmo Assocs. v. City of Seattle, 108 Wash. 2d 20, 24,
735 P.2d 673, 674–75 (1987))).
122. Id. at 759, 49 P.3d at 878.
123. Id. at 760, 49 P.3d at 878.
124. Trimen Dev. Co. v. King County, 124 Wash. 2d 261, 274, 877 P.2d 187, 194 (1994).
125. Isla Verde, 146 Wash. 2d at 761, 49 P.3d at 879 (“We reject the City’s argument that it
satisfies its burden under RCW 82.02.020 merely through a legislative determination . . . .”). In his
concurrence, Justice Johnson stated, “[t]he record before us regarding the contested open space
condition is simply insufficient to determine its appropriateness under RCW 82.02.020.” Id. at 772,
49 P.3d at 884 (Johnson, J., concurring). He further opined that the Court should have remanded the
case for further development of the record with respect to evidence showing the relationship
between the open space condition and the development. Id. at 773, 49 P.3d at 885 (Johnson, J.,
concurring).
126. Trimen, 124 Wash. 2d at 274, 877 P.2d at 194.
127. Isla Verde, 146 Wash. 2d at 764–65, 49 P.3d at 881 (regarding CAMAS, WASH., MUN. CODE
§ 18.62.020(A) (1991), invalidated by Isla Verde, 146 Wash. 2d 740, 49 P.3d 867).
128. Trimen, 124 Wash. 2d at 274, 877 P.2d at 194.
129. Isla Verde, 146 Wash. 2d at 762–63, 49 P.3d at 879–80.
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differences were significant:
We have repeatedly held, as the statute requires, that
development conditions must be tied to a specific, identified
impact of a development on a community. RCW 82.020.020
does not permit conditions that satisfy a “reasonably necessary”
standard for all new development collectively; it specifically
requires that a condition be “reasonably necessary as a direct
result of the proposed development or plat.”130
IV.

KING COUNTY IMPLEMENTED STRINGENT CLEARING
LIMITATIONS ON RURAL LAND OVER RURAL
LANDOWNERS’ OBJECTIONS

King County is home to about 1.9 million people; nearly one third of
them are urbanites of Seattle.131 But nearly twenty percent of the
county’s population lives on large tracts of unincorporated land,132
predominantly zoned for rural, forest, and agricultural uses.133 The
county’s urban center creates environmental problems, especially
stormwater runoff that carries chemicals into rivers and streams.134 One
way to alleviate the problem of chemical runoff is to keep rural land in
its natural condition because natural soil and root systems absorb
pollutants before they reach waterways; concrete and asphalt do not.135
In 2004, to protect local rivers from pollution and to prevent increased
flooding, the King County Council’s growth management committee
proposed an ordinance that prohibited rural landowners from clearing

130. Id. at 761, 49 P.3d at 879 (internal citations omitted). The court upheld that condition, noting
that it was a constitutional exercise of police power. Id. at 763–74, 49 P.3d at 880. For further
discussion about judicial interpretation of police power as applied to land-use issues in Washington,
see Spitzer, supra note 66, at 511.
131. ANNUAL GROWTH 2008, supra note 4, § III, at 26; see ANNUAL GROWTH 2004, supra note
4.
132. ANNUAL GROWTH 2008, supra note 4, § VII, at 116. The estimated 2008 population for
unincorporated King County is 341,150. Id.
133. KING COUNTY, BEST AVAILABLE SCIENCE, VOLUME I: A REVIEW OF SCIENCE LITERATURE
§ 1.2, at 1-7 (2004) [hereinafter BAS I]. About eighty-two percent of the county’s 2130 square miles
of land are part of unincorporated King County. Id. Employment in agriculture, fishing, forestry,
and hunting accounted for an estimated 2651 jobs in 2006 in King County at large. ANNUAL
GROWTH 2008, supra note 4, § II, at 15.
134. BAS I, supra note 133, § 6.2.3, at 6-17; see id. § 7.2.5, at 7-14–15.
135. Id. § 7.2.5, at 7-14–19.
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many of the trees and other vegetation on their land.136 Rural landowners
objected throughout a contentious two-year public comment period,137
arguing that the ordinance unfairly allocated the burden to prevent
environmental harm on the county’s rural community138 and that it
threatened traditional rural activities like horse grazing.139 The full
county council, split along party lines,140 narrowly passed the ordinance
in October 2004.141
A.

King County Proposed Revisions to Its Clearing and Grading
Regulations to Protect King County’s River Systems, Which Are
Threatened by Urban Stormwater Runoff

King County’s six major river systems are fed by mountain rain and
snowmelt.142 However, the numerous streams of the county are
infiltrated by stormwater runoff from developed areas.143 Because
developed areas are generally covered by impervious surfaces, that
runoff carries with it sediment and chemicals that would otherwise be
absorbed and filtered by the terrain in its natural, undeveloped state.144
This runoff causes alterations in natural habitat structures and changes to
water chemistry that impact aquatic species, causing lower reproductive

136. KING COUNTY, WASH., ORDINANCE 15053 § 14 (2004), available at http://www.metrokc.
gov/mkcc/cao/clearing_grading_15053.pdf (codified at KING COUNTY, WASH., CODE tit.
16.82.150,152 (2008), available at http://www.kingcounty.gov/council/legislation /kc_code.aspx).
137. Onstot, supra note 10, at 17; see also Ervin, Panel Approves, supra note 8, at B1.
138. Ervin, County Approves, supra note 10, at B7. “[R]ural landowners mounted months of
protests and blasted [the ordinance] as ‘a massive land grab’ that violates their property rights. . . .
Members of the Republican minority on the County Council blasted the package as unfairly putting
the burden of environmental protection on rural residents, while city dwellers and suburbanites
shoulder little of the burden.” Id. at B1, B7.
139. Summary of Changes to Executive Proposal in Proposed Substitute Ordinance 2004-0124,
Clearing and Grading Ordinance at 3, Ex. 22, Consolidated Index, Citizens’ Alliance v. Sims, No.
04-2-13831-9 (Wash. Super. Ct. Snohomish County, filed Oct. 13, 2006) [hereinafter Changes to
Executive Proposal]; Constantine Proposes More Flexibility for Regulations Protecting Critical
Areas in King County (Sept. 16, 2004), http://www.metrokc.gov/ mkcc/News/2004/0904/DC_
CAO_Striker.htm [hereinafter More Flexibility].
140. Ervin, Restrictions Go Too Far, supra note 8, at A1.
141. KING COUNTY, WASH., ORDINANCE 15053 §§ 14–15.
142. BAS I, supra note 133, § 3.2.1, at 3-1. The White River is the only glacial system in King
County. Id.
143. Id. § 3.2.3, at 3-2.
144. Id. § 7.2.5, at 7-14–7-15; id. § 6.2.3, at 6-17.
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rates, vulnerabilities to predators, and modified migration patterns.145
Impervious surfaces also increase the potential for flooding. Public
agencies have built levees and dug channels to direct and store
stormwater, but these solutions have created problems of their own,
including increased water velocity and stream bank erosion,146 and an
actual reduction in overall floodwater storage capacity.147 These impacts
of development on rivers and streams often deprive fish and wildlife of
passable corridors and bring them into contact with harmful chemical
runoff.148
King County commissioned a comprehensive scientific study in 2002,
published in 2004, that proposed a more natural solution: leave rural
land in its natural state so it can absorb stormwater runoff before it
reaches rivers and streams.149 The study, which relied on the
contributions from more than twenty reputable scientists,150 concluded
that the best way to prevent chemical runoff and maintain “physical,
biological and chemical connectivity” between rivers and the
surrounding land was to leave forestland in its natural state.151
Specifically, the study concluded that King County should limit
impervious surfaces to ten percent of rural land and retain sixty-five
percent of the natural forest cover and vegetation in rural areas.152
King County revised its proposed clearing and grading ordinance in
response to public comments,153 but the ordinance substantially
145. Id. § 7.2.5, at 7-14–7-15; id. § 2.2, at 2-4.
146. Id. § 3.2.3, at 3-4. Increased water velocity can cause “channel scour.” Id. This means
erosion of stream banks (usually along their outside curves) and streambeds. Lake Whatcom
Management Program Glossary of Terms, http://lakewhatcom.wsu.edu/display.asp?ID=67 (last
visited Jun. 22, 2009).
147. BAS I, supra note 133, § 3.2.3, at 3-4. A reduction in floodwater storage is problematic
because it can cause increased flooding and prevents water from traveling in its natural patterns
among wetlands. Id.
148. Id. § 3.2.3, at 3-3–4; id. § 3.3, at 3-10.
149. Id. § 3.2.3, at 3-3; KING COUNTY, BEST AVAILABLE SCIENCE, VOL. II: ASSESSMENT OF
PROPOSED ORDINANCES § 4.2, at 4-5 (2004), available at http://www.kingcounty.gov/property/
permits/codes/CAO.aspx#best [hereinafter BAS II].
150. BAS I, supra note 133, App. C: Science Experts, at C-1–33; see Ervin, County Approves,
supra note 10, at B7 (reporting King County Executive Ron Sims’s rebuttal of accusations that the
Best Available Science report was not good science).
151. BAS I, supra note 133, § 3.2.3, at 3-4.
152. Id. § 7.2.8, at 7-30 (suggesting ten percent limitation on impervious surfaces and a thirtyfive percent clearing limitation).
153. Changes to Executive Proposal, supra note 139, at 3; see More Flexibility, supra note 139,
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conformed to the study findings154 requiring landowners in rural areas to
maintain sixty-five percent of their land in its natural state.155 The
proposed revisions were included as part of King County’s critical areas
ordinance update.156
B.

Rural Residents Opposed King County’s Revised Clearing and
Grading Regulations

Members of the rural community responded to the proposed clearing
and grading ordinance revisions with outrage, arguing vociferously
against the proposal during at least fifteen public meetings.157 Such
stringent clearing limitations, they said, would make their traditional
rural lifestyle impossible, since keeping horses, farming, and homebuilding all require landowners to clear vegetation and trees.158
County leaders amended the proposal to respond to a few of those
concerns, including adding a grandfather provision for lots already
cleared, and allowing owners of lots smaller than five acres to clear fifty
percent of their land.159 They also inserted a “Rural Stewardship Plan”
and “Farm Management Plan,” which allow landowners to petition for
permission to clear larger areas in a way consistent with the county’s
at 1–4.
154. BAS II, supra note 149, § 6.2, at 6-2.
155. KING COUNTY, WASH., ORDINANCE 15053 § 14 (2004), available at http://www.metrokc.
gov/mkcc/cao/clearing_grading_15053.pdf (codified at KING COUNTY, WASH., CODE §§ 16.82.150,
.152 (2008), available at http://www.kingcounty.gov/council/legislation /kc_code.aspx).
156. The King County Code requires updates of its comprehensive plan, including critical areas
ordinances, every five years. KING COUNTY, WASH., CODE § 20.12.010(A) (2008); see also WASH.
REV. CODE § 36.70A.130(4)(a) (2008) (requiring updates of county comprehensive plans every
seven years); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 365-195-900 (2009) (requiring updates of county
comprehensive plans every five years, if needed for compliance with the GMA). Clearing and
grading ordinance 15053 accompanied King County Ordinances 15051 and 15052, which amended
the critical areas and stormwater ordinances, respectively. KING COUNTY, WASH., ORDINANCE
15051 (2004), available at http://www.metrokc.gov/mkcc/cao/critical_areas_15051.pdf (codified at
KING COUNTY, WASH., CODE § 21A.24 (2008), available at http://www.kingcounty.gov/council/
legislation/kc_code.aspx); KING COUNTY, WASH., ORDINANCE 15052 (2004), available at
http://www.metrokc.gov/mkcc/cao/stormwater_15052.pdf, (codified at KING COUNTY, WASH.,
CODE §§ 9.04, 9.12 (2008), available at http://www.kingcounty.gov/council/legislation/kc_code.
aspx).
157. Ervin, County Approves, supra note 10, at B1; Ervin, Court Fight, supra note 10, at B1;
Ervin, Panel Approves, supra note 8, at B1, B4; Onstot, supra note 10, at 17.
158. See Changes to Executive Proposal, supra note 139, at 3; More Flexibility, supra note 139,
at 1.
159. KING COUNTY, WASH., ORDINANCE 15053 § 14.
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underlying goals of protecting rivers and native fish species.160 As
passed, the ordinance limits clearing and the building of permanent
structures, but allows landowners to use their property for certain
logging and recreational activities.161
The changes did little to ameliorate the opposition of rural
landowners: “My take is it’s stealing—out and out stealing,” said
resident Marshall Brenden. “They’re taking 65 percent of your land that
you fought years to pay for, paid mortgages on, and now you can’t use
it.”162 Opponents of the ordinance continued their protest through the
October 2004 county council meeting where the ultimate decision was
made.163 The meeting lasted until late at night.164 In the end, King
County Ordinance 15053 passed 7–6, divided along party lines, with
Democrats voting in favor.165 Republican council members, who largely
represented rural areas of King County, did not hide their anger. Some
argued that the best available science showed no need for such strict
regulations.166 Republican Rob McKenna described the ordinance as one
of “the most draconian land-use regulations in the state, if not the
country.”167
V.

THE WASHINGTON COURT OF APPEALS HELD THAT
THE KING COUNTY ORDINANCE WAS AN UNLAWFUL
TAX

For rural landowners opposed to the new ordinance the fight was not
over. Citizens’ Alliance for Property Rights (Citizens’ Alliance), a
political action committee that had formed in 2003 during the public
hearings process,168 filed a lawsuit against King County in March of
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Private Property May Become Preserved, FOXNEWS, Jul. 10, 2004, http://foxnews.com/
printer_friendly_story/0,3566,124358,00.html.
163. Ervin, County Approves, supra note 10, at B7; Onstot, supra note 10, at 18.
164. Ervin, County Approves, supra note 10, at B1.
165. Onstot, supra note 10, at 17.
166. Ervin, County Approves, supra note 10, at B7 (“Republicans also argued that the county’s
analysis of ‘the best available science’ didn’t show the need for stricter regulation.”).
167. Id. at B7. Rob McKenna is currently Washington’s attorney general. Washington State
Office of the Attorney General—About the Office—About Rob McKenna, http://www.atg.wa.gov/
AboutTheOffice/default.aspx (last visited August 20, 2009).
168. Citizens’ Alliance for Prop. Rights v. Sims, 145 Wash. App. 649, 654, 187 P.3d 786, 789
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2005.169 Citizens’ Alliance argued that the clearing and grading
regulations ran afoul of RCW 82.02.020 as an unlawful tax, fee, or
charge,170 just like the thirty percent land set-aside in Isla Verde.171 King
County disagreed with the comparison of facts to Isla Verde. The county
argued that because the clearing limitations had been passed pursuant to
the Growth Management Act, RCW 82.02.020 did not apply.172 Further,
the county asserted that the controlling case was Trimen, and the
clearing limits were like the Trimen open-space requirements—
necessary to accomplish a legitimate public goal and based on the best
available science.173 The trial court agreed with the county and granted
its motion for summary judgment.174 Citizens’ Alliance appealed.175
The court of appeals heard oral arguments on January 23, 2008,176 and
considered the issue of whether the King County clearing and grading
ordinance violated RCW 82.02.020.177 It issued its decision in favor of
(2008), cert. denied, 165 Wash. 2d. 1030, 203 P.3d 378 (2009); Onstot, supra note 10, at 18.
169. Citizens’ Alliance, 145 Wash. App. at 654, 187 P.3d at 789. The Snohomish County
Superior Court was a proper venue for the action under RCW 36.01.050, which states that actions
against any county may be commenced in the superior court of such county or the superior court of
either of the two nearest judicial districts. WASH. REV. CODE § 36.01.050 (2008).
170. Citizens’ Alliance, 145 Wash. App. at 654, 187 P.3d at 789. Citizens’ Alliance also alleged
constitutional violations of substantive due process. Id.; First Amended Complaint, supra note 14, at
6–7. See supra Part II.A for discussion of substantive due process as it pertains to the Washington
State Judiciary’s evaluation of land-use issues.
171. Plaintiff’s Motion and Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at 7,
Citizens’ Alliance, No. 04-2-13831-9 (Wash. Super. Ct. Snohomish County, filed Aug. 30, 2006).
Both the constitutional and statutory claims came as a facial challenge; there was no proposed
development available for an as-applied challenge to the ordinance. See First Amended Complaint,
supra note 14, passim.
172. Defendant King County’s Response to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment on RCW
82.02.020 Claim at 40–43, Citizens’ Alliance, No. 04-2-13831-9 (Wash. Super. Ct. Snohomish
County, filed Sep. 27, 2006).
173. Id. at 48–55.
174. Citizens’ Alliance, 145 Wash. App. at 655, 187 P.3d at 789; Order Granting King County’s
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on RCW 82.02.020 Claim and Entry of Final Judgment in
Favor of King County at 3, Citizens’ Alliance, No. 04-2-13831-9 (Wash. Super. Ct. Snohomish
County Dec. 22, 2006).
175. Citizens’ Alliance, 145 Wash. 2d at 655, 187 P.3d at 789. Notice of Appeal, Citizens’
Alliance, No. 04-2-13831-9 (Superior Court for the State of Washington, Snohomish County, filed
Jan. 12, 2007).
176. Court of Appeals Division I, Oral Argument Calendar for Wednesday, January 23, 2008.
177. Citizens’ Alliance, 145 Wash. 2d at 653, 187 P.3d at 788. The court of appeals determined
that its discussion and holding pertaining to the statutory violation resolved the issue, and did not
analyze the substantive due process claim. Id. at 671, 187 P.3d at 797.
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Citizens’ Alliance on July 7, 2008,178 reversing the trial court’s ruling.
The “threshold questions” were whether the clearing limitations
imposed a “tax, fee, or charge,” and if so, whether they fell within one of
the exceptions in RCW 82.02.020.179 The court held that the ordinance
was subject to the statute, that it qualified as an “in kind indirect ‘tax,
fee, or charge’” under RCW 82.02.020,180 and that it did not fall within
the statutory exceptions.181 In making its finding, the court relied almost
entirely on Isla Verde.182 In fact, the court described the City of Camas
set-aside at issue in Isla Verde as “not materially distinguishable” from
King County’s clearing limitations.183
The court rejected King County’s argument that because the clearing
limitation’s purpose was land-use regulation, and not the raising of
revenue, Trimen was controlling precedent, meaning the ordinance
“[did] not constitute a ‘tax, fee, or charge.’”184 However, the court did
not expressly find that the main purpose of the ordinance was to raise
revenue. Instead, it relied on the conclusion that “[t]he plain words of the
statute indicate that its application is not limited to ‘taxes,’”185 and
characterized Washington case law as “clear that RCW 82.02.020
applies to ordinances that may require developers to set aside land as a
condition of development.”186 The court also rejected King County’s
argument that the clearing ordinance could not possibly violate the state
preemption statute because it had been passed pursuant to mandatory
GMA requirements imposed by the state legislature.187 The GMA did
178. Id. at 649, 187 P.3d at 786. On the panel for the Washington State Court of Appeals,
Division I: Judge Cox (writing), Judge Agid, Judge Ellington. Id. at 652, 672, 187 P.3d at 788, 798.
179. Id. at 657, 187 P.3d at 790.
180. Id. at 653, 187 P.3d at 788.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 660–61, 665–66, 187 P.3d at 791–92, 794–95.
183. Id. at 661, 187 P.3d at 792. For the court, the only distinguishing fact was that King County
had not offered a “payment of a fee in lieu” exception, whereas the City of Camas provided for this
alternative. Id.
184. Id. at 662, 187 P.3d at 792; see Defendant King County’s Response to Plaintiffs’ Motion for
Summary Judgment on RCW 82.02.020 Claim, supra note 172, at 44–48; see also Hillis Homes,
Inc. v. Snohomish County, 97 Wash. 2d 804, 810, 650 P.2d 193, 195–96 (1982) (holding that where
local governments exact fees in order to raise revenue, rather than to forward a regulatory purpose,
those fees constitute an unlawful tax under the Washington State Constitution).
185. Citizens’ Alliance, 145 Wash. App. at 662, 187 P.3d at 793.
186. Id. at 663, 187 P.3d at 793 (citing Isla Verde International Holdings, Inc. v. City of Camas,
146 Wash. 2d 740, 758, 49 P.3d 867, 877 (2002)).
187. Id.
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not require the particular clearing limitations the county had approved,
said the court, and “no Washington law supports the County’s argument
that [the ordinance] is exempt from the requirements of RCW 82.02.020
because it was adopted in response to the State’s GMA requirements.”188
Having determined that the clearing and grading ordinance was an inkind indirect tax, fee, or charge under RCW 82.02.020,189 the court
turned to the next threshold question: Did it fall within one of the statepreemption statute’s listed exceptions? Specifically, was it “reasonably
necessary as a direct result of the proposed development”?190 The court
stated that this second question was more difficult to answer.191 To
prevail, King County would have to bear the burden of showing that
there was a “nexus” and “rough proportionality” between the clearing
limitations and the proposed development.192 These were two separate
requirements, said the court, and the trial court had erred by addressing
only the “nexus” requirement.193 While King County had met its burden
of showing a nexus by submitting “a wealth of unchallenged
evidence,”194 it had failed to show rough proportionality.195 It could not
meet that burden, said the court, because it had not conducted a sitespecific evaluation of the proposed development.196 The county’s
attempt to rely on Trimen, in which there was no site-specific evaluation,
again failed. The court characterized Trimen as “mak[ing] clear that the
reason the ordinance at issue there satisfied the statute was because its
requirement was reasonably necessary as a direct result of Trimen’s
development.”197 Because King County failed to meet its burden, the
court held that the ordinance was an illegal “in kind indirect ‘tax, fee, or
charge’” on new development, and remanded the matter to the trial
188. Id.
189. Id. at 661–62, 187 P.3d at 792.
190. Id. at 665, 187 P.3d at 794 (emphasis omitted).
191. Id.
192. Id. The court’s “nexus” and “rough proportionality” language came from federal takings law
under the Fifth Amendment. See Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987)
(requiring a “nexus” between permit condition and purpose of permit condition); Dolan v. City of
Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1986) (requiring “rough proportionality” between land use regulation
and proposed development).
193. Citizens’ Alliance, 145 Wash. App. at 665, 187 P.3d at 794.
194. Id. at 669–70, 187 P.3d at 796.
195. Id. at 670, 180 P.3d at 796.
196. Id. at 668–69, 187 P.3d at 796.
197. Id. at 667, 668–69, 187 P.3d at 795, 796.
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court, directing it to enter an order for summary judgment in favor of
Citizens’ Alliance.198
The Washington State Supreme Court denied King County’s petition
for review on March 3, 2009.199
VI.

THE COURT ERRED IN DECIDING CITIZENS’ ALLIANCE
V. SIMS, A DECISION THAT UNDERMINES THE GMA
AND COMPREHENSIVE LAND-USE PLANNING

The Washington State Court of Appeals was wrong to conclude that
King County’s clearing ordinance was not a direct result of the proposed
development for one simple reason: There was no proposed development
in the case. The court’s mistake was in analyzing the issue under the
wrong body of law: Citizens’ Alliance had brought a facial challenge,200
which meant there was no specific proposed development for the county
to evaluate, and the court’s application of RCW 82.02.020 was
erroneous. Alternatively, the court should have evaluated the restrictions
in question as a possible regulatory taking or a violation of substantive
due process.201
The court’s ruling rejects the public policy choices inherent in the
GMA, and it represents judicial intrusion into legislative decisionmaking. This could have starkly negative consequences for Washington
land-use planning. The legislature passed RCW 82.02.020 to prevent
local governments from exacting fees from landowners and developers
as a condition for approval of a specific development. It did not intend
for the law to preclude all comprehensive local land-use planning, yet
this is exactly the implicit effect of the court’s ruling.

198. Id. at 672, 187 P.3d at 797–98.
199. Citizens’ Alliance for Property Rights v. Sims, 165 Wash. 2d 1030, 203 P.3d 378 (2009).
The King County clearing and grading ordinance is still technically in effect, but the county will not
enforce it. Questions and Answers Regarding Court Rulings on King County’s Clearing Limits in
the Critical Areas Ordinance, http://www.kingcounty.gov/property/permits/codes/CAO/Court
RulingsQA.aspx (last visited July 15, 2009).
200. The handling of “facial challenges” versus “as-applied” challenges by Washington courts is
an extensive topic that is not addressed in detail in this Note.
201. See supra Part II for explanation of regulatory taking and substantive due process
challenges.
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A.

The Court Erred When It Applied RCW 82.02.020 Because
There Was No “Proposed Development”

The Washington State Legislature adopted RCW 82.02.020 to prevent
local governments from leveraging their power to approve development
plats by exacting revenue from developers. The statute is designed to
ensure that developers carry only their fair share of the cost of
community infrastructure or environmental protection. The statute
clearly targets parties that have proposed developments, as it allows
dedications, easements, or fees in lieu that are “reasonably necessary as
a direct result of the proposed development.”202
The court was mistaken in relying on Trimen and Isla Verde, because
neither case is on point. In both cases, the Supreme Court of Washington
was able to consider the reasonableness of local government regulations
and fees as applied to proposed development because actual proposals
for development were at issue: In Trimen, a developer had proposed two
plats, encompassing forty-three acres and 118 homes;203 in Isla Verde,
the developer had proposed a thirteen-acre development with fifty-one
homes.204 In Citizens’ Alliance v. King County, no development had
been proposed.
Trimen and Isla Verde do not mandate the outcome in Citizens’
Alliance. Instead, they recognize King County’s authority to pass an
ordinance like the clearing and grading limitations at issue in Citizens’
Alliance. In Trimen, the court recognized that RCW 82.02.020 does not
affect a local government’s power to pass reasonably calculated
comprehensive land-use regulations,205 and it refused to characterize the
open-space set-aside as an unlawful tax under the state preemption
statute.206 Further, the court ruled that the fee charged the developer was
“reasonably necessary as a direct result of the proposed development”
based on data from an area study commissioned by the county

202. WASH. REV. CODE § 82.02.020 (2008) (emphasis added).
203. See Trimen Dev. Co. v. King County, 124 Wash. 2d 261, 266, 877 P.2d 187, 190 (1994)
(noting that Trimen proposed 2 developments with 77 and 41 lots for detached family homes,
respectively, for a total of 118 lots).
204. Isla Verde Int’l Holdings, Inc. v. City of Camas, 146 Wash. 2d 740, 746, 49 P.3d 867, 871
(2002).
205. Trimen, 124 Wash. 2d at 275, 877 P.2d at 194; see id. at 270, 877 P.2d at 192.
206. Id. at 270, 877 P.2d at 192.
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government.207 The King County clearing and grading ordinance at issue
in Citizens’ Alliance is indistinguishable from the Trimen open-space
set-aside: After a long and detailed area study, King County concluded
that clearing and grading limitations were required to preserve water
quality and prevent increased flooding.208 If a landowner were to
propose a specific development, the county would be able to rely on its
study findings in considering other site-specific limitations that might be
necessary to further the county’s underlying goals. It bears repeating that
consideration of RCW 82.02.020 is unnecessary in this case because no
one proposed to develop a specific site.
Dictum in Isla Verde also suggests that King County has authority to
impose its clearing and grading ordinance. The Isla Verde court
acknowledged a local government’s inherent police power authority to
regulate land use by passing zoning ordinances,209 but found that the
City of Camas land set-aside requirement could not be defended as a
zoning ordinance because it applied to all proposed developments,
“regardless of zoning.”210 Presumably, if the City of Camas set-aside
requirement had tracked a reasonably calculated zoning classification, its
regulation would have been permissible. The Isla Verde court also
distinguished Trimen, noting that the comprehensive area study
supporting the need for open space in Trimen fulfilled the “reasonably
necessary” component of the state preemption statute, whereas the mere
legislative determination of that need in Isla was insufficient.211 The
King County clearing limitation was based on a comprehensive area
study and was applied only to land zoned rural residential.212
While RCW 82.02.020 does not apply in this case, it does not follow
that King County is unlimited in the land-use restrictions it may impose.
The county is subject to important state constitutional limitations,
including substantive due process requirements and the prohibition on

207. Id.
208. KING COUNTY, WASH., ORDINANCE 15053 § 14A (2004), available at http://www.metrokc.
gov/mkcc/cao/clearing_grading_15053.pdf (codified at KING COUNTY, WASH., CODE § 16.82.150A
(2005), available at http://www.kingcounty.gov/council/legislation/kc_code.aspx).
209. See Isla Verde, 146 Wash. 2d at 763–65, 49 P.3d at 880–81.
210. Id. at 764–65, 49 P.3d at 880–81.
211. Id. at 760–61, 49 P.3d at 878–79.
212. KING COUNTY, WASH., ORDINANCE 15053 § 14A; BAS II, supra note 149, § 6, at 6-1–14;
see Citizens’ Alliance for Prop. Rights v. Sims, 145 Wash. App. 649, 653, 669–70, 187 P.3d 786,
788, 796 (2008), cert. denied, 165 Wash. 2d. 1030, 203 P.3d 378 (2009).
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takings. The court of appeals should have analyzed King County’s
regulation under those protections and precedents.
It is critically important that courts use the correct body of law to
evaluate land-use regulations. If they require local governments to
evaluate a possible regulation’s potential impact on every affected parcel
of land, regardless of whether a development has been proposed there,
attempts at comprehensive land-use planning will fail.
B.

Citizens’ Alliance v. Sims Undermines the Objectives of the
GMA and Has Dire Implications for the Future of Land-Use
Planning in Washington

The Washington State Legislature passed the GMA to promote
comprehensive land-use planning in a climate of rapid population
growth and urban sprawl.213 Comprehensive land-use planning requires
consideration of locales in their entirety. In the case of environmental
planning, planners must evaluate entire ecosystems, ignoring artificial
property lines. Stormwater runs faster over impervious surfaces
regardless of who owns the land, and stormwater runoff carries sediment
and toxins into Washington’s river systems. In addition to deciding upon
a statewide course that includes comprehensive land-use planning, the
GMA also represents a legislative determination that local government is
in the best position to create those plans.214 The GMA includes several
different environmental and economic goals—some of which
occasionally conflict—and the legislature vested the task of balancing
those goals in the local governments, which represent the communities
the regulations will affect.215
In Citizens’ Alliance, the Washington Court of Appeals undermined
those legislative priorities. If local governments have to evaluate each
potentially affected parcel of land as part of their comprehensive landuse planning, those plans will fail simply because comprehensive
planning requires laws of general application. Such a result is directly at
odds with the GMA. Moreover, it runs counter to the very foundation of
local police powers, which exist to benefit the health, safety, and welfare
of the community overall.
213. See Settle & Gavigan, supra note 3, at 880–81.
214. See supra Part I.
215. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 36.70A.040, .120 (2008); Settle & Gavigan, supra note 3, at 896–
98.
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The decision in Citizens’ Alliance also undermines the goals of the
GMA by making comprehensive planning prohibitively expensive and
inefficient, without a corresponding benefit. In fact, it undermines
property development by forcing local governments to commission
environmental evaluations of each parcel of property in order to reach a
conclusion based on the best available science, even if an analysis of the
general area would achieve the same results. Because of limited public
funds, the cost of individualized studies would likely be imposed on
property owners and developers. Such an intrusion onto local property
would also be an unwanted invasion from the private property owner’s
perspective. It is difficult to identify any benefit from such a mandate
other than satisfying the court’s new legal requirement. Furthermore, the
newly required evaluations would cause long delays while potential
regulations are considered with respect to every specific site to which
they could be applied. The result of implementing most police powers in
this site-specific manner would be impractical and cost-prohibitive. In
this case, such an implementation is an ineffective means of protecting
community interests through comprehensive land-use planning.
CONCLUSION
The Citizens’ Alliance holding undermines the comprehensive nature
of the GMA and a well established approach to land-use planning. The
opinion contemplates imposing clearing and grading limit regulations
based on site-specific evaluations, requiring the county to expend
already tight resources and to implement an inefficient method for
protecting community interests in environmental protection and
preservation. Landowners in Washington State have access to numerous
protections against overreaching government regulations that impede
private property rights to an unreasonable degree: Constitutional,
statutory, and administrative remedies exist for abuses of police powers.
However, Washington’s preemption statute, RCW 82.02.020, is an
inappropriate framework for analyzing a facial challenge of King
County’s clearing and grading regulations, and the court of appeals erred
when it held otherwise. Despite the court’s decision, GMA objectives
and requirements remain. Municipalities are still obligated to have
regulations based on the best available science that protect the functions
and values of critical areas. The actual impact of Citizens’ Alliance
remains to be seen, but absent a judicial correction or legislative
clarification, treating comprehensive land-use regulations as a “tax, fee,
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or charge” subject to the state preemption statute, without application to
a proposed development, threatens to render comprehensive land-use
planning nearly impossible to achieve.
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